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blatant human rights violations if all are
“American vital interests”? Yes, it can be
done—but the argument is less clear.
Martel’s final principle is that the
nation must strengthen alliances
and partnerships to promote shared
responsibilities effectively to solve global
problems. Recognizing that American
power is limited, Martel counsels against
temptations toward either American
overreach or American withdrawal on
key global and regional problems.
Martel applies these principles to
“current” foreign policy issues to
illustrate their utility; the inevitable
drawback to such relevance is the danger
of “shelf life” interest, i.e., how long
will readers care about or even recall
foreign policy specifics from 2014?
Conversely, some topics that seem
important at the time of this writing
(e.g., violent Wahhabism, Russian
aggressiveness) receive little attention.
A weakness of generalized, historically
centered summaries of policy decisions
is the tendency to see, in retrospect,
clear choices and definite paths, but
to underestimate the uncertainty and
angst that decision makers suffered. By
contrast, specific case studies (e.g., the
Cuban missile crisis, Vietnam, the 2003
Iraq war, the 2008 economic crisis) always show the confusion and fear. Martel’s sweeping review gives surprisingly
little attention to the fact that nearly
all grand strategy decisions are made
while under risk or amid uncertainty by
those who are fraught with anxiety and
apprehension, and constitute gambles on
guesses rather than calm choices about
how best to balance good principles and
achieve optimal outcomes. Martel—who
certainly understood the policy-making
process—might have replied that the
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purpose of his final book was to advise
policy makers and scholars on how such
decisions should be made, rather than to
describe how they will feel while doing
so. But readers might have benefited
from at least an acknowledgment of
this apprehension, the way Bill Martel
used to offer a cheerful but sympathetic
smile to friends and students struggling
with problems he had posed to us.
The date of this book’s release—12
January 2015—was the day its author
died at the age of fifty-nine after a
yearlong battle with leukemia. Bill
Martel was for ten years a professor
of international security studies at the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
at Tufts University (where he received
the James L. Paddock award for teaching
excellence) and an adjunct electives
professor at the Naval War College.
Previously, he had taught in the College’s
National Security Decision Making
Department for half a dozen years,
following a similar period as founding
director of the Air Force’s Center for
Strategy and Technology at the Air War
College. He also had served as an adviser
to the National Security Council and the
Romney 2012 presidential campaign.
This reviewer was one of his many
colleagues and students who counted
themselves blessed by his friendship.
THOMAS GRASSEY

The Struggle for Sea Power: A Naval History of
the American Revolution, by Sam Willis. New
York: W. W. Norton, 2016. 608 pages. $35 (Kindle
$16.05).

Sam Willis describes (p. 5) the war for
American independence as “the most
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intriguing naval story in history.” To
support this contention, Willis has
written a book aimed primarily at a general audience and based on a narrative
approach, first chronicling the maritime
conflict between Britain and its rebellious American colonies, then addressing the ensuing global maritime war.
Although the book is written as a
chronological narrative, Willis identifies five underlying themes that knit
the maritime story of the war into a
broadly defined seapower thesis.
The first theme involves the author’s
assertion (p. 5) “that sea power can exist
without navies.” Although lacking Britain’s established naval infrastructure, the
colonists, Willis argues, still developed
and exploited sea power. This theme
dominates the text during the early years
of the war, but regrettably becomes but a
minor story line after the French entry.
The second theme argues (p. 6) that
naval historians generally “make a
false distinction between” saltwater
and freshwater navies in places such
as Lake Champlain. Willis claims that
contemporaries made no such distinction. Certainly, Willis is correct to point
out similarities between the types, but
the differences are more significant
than Willis admits, particularly in the
instruments used and the obstacles
faced. Even more than the first theme,
this one is episodic and hardly
merits being elevated to a theme.
Willis’s third theme focuses on the
global nature of the war. Willis clearly
demonstrates that much more was
at stake than the independence of
thirteen of Britain’s North American
colonies. This theme is addressed
quite effectively after 1778 through a
traditional narrative of naval operations.
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The global nature of the war meant
that numerous campaigns occurred
simultaneously, and events in one region
influenced what occurred elsewhere.
This is Willis’s fourth theme. Willis
provides insightful commentary on
such interactions when explaining fleet
movements and campaigns, but devotes
too little attention to the decision
making in London and Paris. To
understand truly the interaction among
theaters, Willis needed to explain more
effectively how leaders in Paris, London,
and Madrid prioritized among competing options. For example, Willis fails to
grasp the nuances of Britain’s strategic
position, including the calculus used in
determining the distribution of fleets
between home and foreign waters, and
particularly the essential role of Gibraltar in Britain’s strategic architecture.
The fifth and final theme is the most
far-reaching. It addresses how sea power
affected the broader war—whether
through diplomacy, campaigns on
land, the politics of the states involved,
or particularly the decisions of the
military and political leadership. “As
always,” Willis maintains (p. 292),
“the impact of sea power must be
measured in more ways than one.”
Willis aptly argues that sea power was
a significant element in the American
Revolution that should not be overlooked. It influenced events from the
war’s origin to its end. Yet although he
often supports his arguments with a high
degree of skill, the book fails to entirely
meet its potential. Willis is not the first
to address sea power and its relation to
this war, but he does not place his thesis
into the context of previous works on
the subject. This is particularly glaring
with regard to Alfred Thayer Mahan.
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Willis cites only Mahan’s book on the
American Revolution; he does not cite
The Influence of Sea Power upon History,
1660–1783, Mahan’s most significant
work and the one that put the term “sea
power” into widespread use. Considering that Willis has written a book about
sea power and even uses (p. 6) the
phrase “the influence of sea power,” the
omission is evident. Although Willis
defines sea power more broadly than
does Mahan, many of The Influence of
Sea Power’s themes echo powerfully in
his work. Like Willis, Mahan considers
the global maritime war spawned by the
struggle for American independence to
be the most intriguing of naval wars.
The second, related weakness involves
the quality of the scholarship. Although
Willis uses archival and published
primary sources, he often relies on other
historians. This is particularly true
regarding memorable quotations from
those who were present. Rather than
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consistently consulting original sources
for both the accuracy and the historical
context of the quotes, Willis relies on
the legwork of previous historians.
Overall, Willis has written an intriguing
appraisal of sea power in the American
Revolution. It is a sweeping narrative
that benefits greatly from Willis’s
eloquence as a writer and his superb
ability to tell a story. However, the
book is not without its weaknesses.
Some of the author’s themes require
development, the source base could
be strengthened, and Willis needed to
develop stronger links between naval
operations and the decision making
by those at the highest positions in
government. The book is on its surest
ground in the early chapters when addressing the development of American
sea power, and later in the text when
recounting major naval operations.
KEVIN D. MCCRANIE
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